Human Driver Temperament and the Safety Impact of a C-V2X Denial-of-Service Flooding Attack in Mixed-Autonomy Traffic

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Conference Proceedings
Authors: Rasheed Bello, Varghese Vaidyan, Gurcan Comert, Vijay Bendigeri, Akinbobola Jegede, Judith Mwakalonge
Abstract

Cooperative and connected automated vehicles (CAVs) rely on Signal Phase and Timing (SPaT) messages to cross signalized intersections; a denial-of-service (DoS) flood that blocks SPaT forces CAVs into a fail-safe mode. Because human-driven vehicles share the intersection, the safety consequence depends not only on the attack and the CAV fail-safe policy, but on how the surrounding human drivers behave. We investigate this human-factors dimension with a coupled OMNeT++/INET (5G NR-V2X) and SUMO microsimulation of a signalized corridor, sweeping CAV market penetration (10–90%), four calibrated driver temperaments (cautious to aggressive) and two standards-based fail-safe policies, a minimal-risk maneuver (MRM) and an adaptive cruise control (ACC) keep-driving fallback, with each attack arm differenced against its policy-matched no-attack baseline. Temperament's effect on the attack is specific and modest rather than a blanket amplification. Aggressive surroundings worsen one metric, the hard-braking a keep-driving fail-safe forces on nearby drivers (p = 0.03), rising from near zero to +8 episodes/1000 veh-s. They appear to dampen rear-end conflicts, but only because the flood clears the queues aggressive drivers build, so the gain is in flow, not safety. On the attack's primary signatures, CAV red-light running and crossing conflicts, temperament has no detectable effect. It instead dominates baseline risk, producing a 13- to 18-fold cautious-to-aggressive gradient far larger than the attack itself, which acts through a channel already congested by CAV adoption. Human driver populations determine how dangerous the intersection is but do not systematically amplify this attack, so fail-safe design cannot assume a cautious test population bounds the risk.

Keywords: Mixed-Autonomy Traffic Safety, C-V2X Denial-of-Service Attack, Human Driver Temperament, Connected and Automated Vehicles, Surrogate Safety Measures, Minimal-Risk Maneuver, Vehicul

DOI: 10.54941/ahfe1008433

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